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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Bruno V. Bitker*
I feel more strongly than ever that the worth of the individual
human being is the most unique and precious of all our assets and must
be the beginning and the end of all of our efforts. Governments, sys-
tems, ideologies and institutions come and go, but humanity remains.
The nature and value of this most precious asset is increasingly appre-
ciated as we see how empty organized life becomes when we remove or
suppress the infinite variety and vitality of the individual.1
It is unbelievable, in light of American history that anyone
could question the right of the United States to enter into inter-
national agreements to protect human rights. However, there con-
tinues to exist a belief by some lawyers that under the United States
Constitution human rights generally are not a proper subject for
agreement between nations.
2
This paper approaches the issue from three viewpoints: One,
that the constitutional treaty power does not bar such agreements;
Two, that historically the power to enter into such international
agreements has been exercised by the United States since the ear-
liest days of the Republic; and, Three, that by contract (treaty) the
United States is obligated internationally to protect human rights.
Within the limitations of the length of this paper, reference will
also be made to questions raised as to the constitutionality of some
specific provisions of certain treaties.
HISTORICAL POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES
Entering into treaties for the protection of human rights is not
uniquely American. International concern for human rights has
* LL.B. Cornell; attorney, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; U.S. Representative to U.N.
International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 1968; Member, President's
Commission for Human Rights Year, 1968; Member, U.S. National Commission for
UNESCO, 1965-71; Chairman, Wis. Governor's Commission on the U.N.; Chairman,
ABA Section Committee International Courts.
1 INTRODU CTION TO TME REPORT OF TE SECRETARY GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/8401/
Add. 1 at 55 (1971).
2 For the principle objections by certain lawyers see Holman, International Pro-
posals Affecting So-Called Human Rights, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 479 (1949).
Hearings on Exec. 0, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. before a Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 92d Cong. 1st Sess., at 23 (1971); Hearings on Execs. J, K, and L,
before a Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2,
40 (1967); Hearings on Exec. 0, before a Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., at 154, 206, 221 (1950).
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existed for centuries.3 In fact, the very first treaty entered into by
the United States recognized protection of the rights of individuals:
the Definitive Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, concluded at
Paris, 1783.' Article VI provided, inter alia, that because of partici-
pation in the Revolutionary war "no person shall, on that account,
suffer any future loss or damage, either in his person, liberty or
property . . . ."I Even the rights of foreign persons to go to any
part of the United States for a specified period to regain assets were
specifically recognized." And, in the Jay Treaty of 1794,' which was
the final formalized treaty, there are other provisions protecting
individual rights.
In 1795, the United States entered into a treaty with Algiers'
which related to rights of Americans in Algiers, and, inter alia, pro-
vided that the Consul of the United States "shall have liberty to
exercise his religion in his own house."9 This was an early recogni-
tion by the United States of certain rights of privacy and freedom
of religion as proper subjects for an international treaty. While the
phrase "human rights" may not have been in common usage in the
18th century, the individual rights then recognized would now come
under the broad umbrella of human rights.
Many of these early 18th century treaties dealt with the rights
of American persons abroad. They clearly demonstrate that individ-
ual rights are proper subjects for international agreements. The
more modern treaties on human rights are logical developments in
the protection of these rights. These developments are in keeping
not only with American ideals but also with the early historical
practice of the United States. Thus it may be said that concern for
human rights by treaty is traditionally American.
Subsequent American history bears this out as indicated by a
sampling of 19th century treaties. The treaty with Austria-Hungary
of 1848 covers the right to dispose of property upon death," a
matter usually considered controlled by municipal law. The 1868
treaty with Belgium" covered matters relating to naturalization,
also customarily considered sacrosanct to national sovereignty. In
8 See L. SOHN & T. BURGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS(Prelim. ed. 1972). [hereinafter cited as SOHN & BURGENTHAL].
4 1 W. MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, ETC., BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS 586 (1910) [hereinafter cited as W. MALLOY]; S. Doc.
No. 357, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910).
5 W. MALLOY, supra note 4, at 589.
0 Id. at 588.
7 Id. at 590.
8 Id. at 1.
9 Id. at 4.
10 Id. at 34 (clauses I and II).
11 Id. at 80.
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an 1858 treaty with Bolivia,12 there is what might be called an equal
protection clause as well as protection against "arbitrary visits or
search" of dwellings and warehouses. This sounds as if the Fourth
Amendment had moved into international law.
Besides Fourth Amendment rights, the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel was included in the 1828 treaty with Brazil. 3 This treaty
also assumed equal treatment in the burial of the dead. The Proto-
col of 1872 to the treaty of 1871 with Germany, specified with
respect to the estate of a deceased citizen, "[t]hat, according to the
laws and the Constitution of the United States, Article X (of the
treaty) applies, not only to persons of the male sex, but also to
persons of the female sex.') 14
An interesting corollary to individual rights, is the individual
responsibility covered in the 1842 treaty with Colombia. Article
XXXV, provides that if "citizens of either party shall infringe any
of the articles of this treaty, such citizens shall be held personally
responsible for the same, . . .each party engaging in no way to
protect the offender, or sanction such violation."' 5 Even the phrase
"international right" is used in the Colombia treaty of 1846.16
It is interesting to note that the treaty of 1842 also recognizes the
individual responsibility rule which was basic to the Nuremberg
judgment more than a century later.' A similar provision appears
in the 1828 treaty with Brazil i" and in other treaties.
Under the 1803 treaty with France for the Cession of Louisi-
ana, the United States undertook, in Article III, to incorporate the
inhabitants' territory as soon as possible and "in the mean time
they shall be maintained in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property and the Religion which they profess."'" The treaty of 1831
12 Id. at 114 (art. III).
13 Id. at 137 (art. XII).
14 Id. at 553.
15 Id. at 313 (para. 4).
16 Id.
17 Nuremberg Judgment, 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 171, 223 (Nuremberg 1947); 6 F.R.D. 69, 110
(1947). On December 11, 1946, the General Assembly, by resolution (U.N. Doc. A/C
6/69 (1946)) affirmed the principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal and directed that the
laws be codified. Subsequently, the International Law Commission adopted the prin-
ciples of the Charter and Judgment which includes:
Principle I. Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under
international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment.
Principle IV. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Govern-
ment or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under inter-
national law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible. II Y.B. INT'L L.
Comm. 374, U.N. Doc. A/136 (1950).
18 W. MALLOY, supra note 4, at 143.
19 Id. at 509.
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with Mexico, Article XV, guarantees that the citizens of Mexico
residing in the United States "shall be allowed the free exercise of
their religion, in public or in private."2
Although not a party to the Berlin Treaty of July 13, 1878,21
the United States, in 1902, on the strength of that treaty, asserted
the right of diplomatic intervention on behalf of citizens of another
country who were asserting their rights within that other country.
The Berlin Treaty had provided that no person should be discrimi-
nated against because of religious differences. In these instances,
the United States was specifically protesting the treatment of
Rumanian Jews by the Government of Rumania.22
In the 20th century, a similarly wide variety of matters has
been deemed proper for treaty ratification by the United States.
These include the Convention on Drugs of 1912,23 the Slavery Con-
vention of 1926,24 World Health Organization regulations,25 the
Protection and Preservation of Wild Life Convention of 1940,28
and the Road Traffic Convention of 1949.27 A classic example is
the treaty protecting migratory birds flying over Canada and the
United States .2  The Supreme Court held the subject matter justi-
fied the exercise of the treaty-making power and federal legislation
thereunder. It is almost ludicrous to assert that lives of migratory
birds can be protected by a treaty, but that the lives of human
beings cannot, as is contemplated under the Genocide Convention."
As Professor Henkin commented:
The argument that the United States is without power under the Con-
stitution to adhere to such treaties has no basis whatever-in the
language of the Constitution, in its travaux prdparatoires, in the insti-
tutions it established, in its principles of federalism or of separation of
powers, in almost two centuries of constitutional history, or in any
other consideration relevant to constitutional interpretation.30
20 Id. at 1089.
21 SOHN & BURGENTHAL at 194.
22 Id. at 199-200.
23 38 Stat. 1912, 1937, T.S. No. 612 (1913).
24 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778 (1926).
25 7 U.S.T., T.I.A.S. No. 3482 (1948); 18 U.S.T. 3003, T.I.A.S. 6393 (1967);
Hearings on Execs. J, K, and L, before a Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 89 (Part 2) (1967).
26 56 Stat. 1354, T.S. No. 981 (1940).
27 3 U.S.T., 3008, T.I.A.S. No. 2487 (1949); Hearings on Execs. J, K, and L,
before a Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
at 89 (Part 2) (1967).
28 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
29 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78
U.N.T.S. 277. The text of the Convention may be found in S. Exac. Doc. No. B, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
80 See Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116
PA. L. REV. 1012, 1014-15 (1968).
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In referring to the U.N. Covenants and the Protocol on Human
Rights, which have not yet been sent to the U.S. Senate by the
President, Professor Brunson MacChesney observes that:
The complex and important issues involved in the decision as to whether
the United States should ratify the Covenants and the Protocol in their
present form should not be obscured by the interjection of constitu-
tional objections that are lacking in substance. . . .It would not be
worthy of our heritage and our responsibilities to abstain on spurious
constitutional grounds. 31
In the light of these brief historical references to United States
treaties and the observations of scholars, it is easy to understand
the comment of the Clark Committee as to the constitutionality of
human rights treaties: "It may seem almost anachronistic that this
question continues to be raised." 2
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
The constitutionality of human rights treaties has been the
subject of innumerable treatises, law review articles, and books
ever since the U.N. Charter came into force on October 24, 1945. 8
Under the Constitution, the power to enter into treaties and
the subject matters that may be covered appear almost unlimited.
The Constitution provides that the President "shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties,
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." 34 Emphasis is
given to the importance of treaties because the Constitution declares
that treaties "shall be the supreme Law of the Land,' 35 and Congress
is empowered to define and punish "Offenses against the Law of Na-
tions."38
As early as 1796, the Supreme Court recognized the Supremacy
Clause as it related to the peace treaty with England which pre-
vented a state from eliminating debts due to British subjects.3"
8' 62 Am. J. INT'L L. 917 (1968).
32 PRESIDENT'S COIN24ISSION FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF HumAN RIGHTS YEAR, RE-
PORT OF THE COMMISSION (1969) [hereinafter cited as CLARK REPORT].
83 See, among other treatises, H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTs (1950). See also McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World
Community: Constitutional Illusions versus Rational Action, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 490 (1949); Chafee, Federal and State Powers Under the U.N. Covenant on
Human Rights, 26 Wis. L. REV. 391 (1951); Senate Staff Study on U.N. Charter, S.
Doc. No. 164, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., at 303 (1954); Hearings on Exec. 0, before a
Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., (1950).
34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
35 Id. art. VI, § 2.
86 Id. art. I, § 8 (10).
37 Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dal]. 199 (1796).
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Certainly, no one today would claim the right of states to avoid
treaty obligations.
Power to enact a treaty has long been acknowledged by the
Supreme Court. In Geofroy v. Riggs,8 the Court said:
It would not be contended that it (the treaty-making power) extends
so far as to authorize what the constitution forbids, or a change in the
character of the government or in that of one of the states, or a cession
of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent. [Cita-
tion omitted] But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is
any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching on any matter
which is properly the subject of negotiations with a foreign country.39
Despite the almost limitless powers envisioned by the Riggs
decision, the treaty-making power does not rise above the Constitu-
tion. It is rather a vital element within the Constitution. 40
It is difficult to interpret any of the principal human rights
treaties approved by the United Nations, or its specialized agencies,
as requiring something to be done which is contrary to the Consti-
tution. For example, treaties declaring mass murder an international
crime, 4' or preventing forced labor,4" or securing the political rights
of women, 43 or opposing racial discrimination,44 or minimizing dis-
crimination in education45 do not authorize something which the
Constitution forbids.
In 1969, a Special Committee of Lawyers of the President's
Commission for the Observance of Human Rights Year, of which
Justice Tom C. Clark, retired, was chairman, issued its report.46 In
his letter of transmittal, Justice Clark said:
I would like to reiterate here, however, our finding, after a thorough re-
view of judicial, Congressional and diplomatic precedents, that human
rights are matters of international concern, and the President, with the
United States Senate concurring, may, on behalf of the United States,
under the treaty power of the Constitution, ratify or adhere to any
international human rights convention that does not contravene a spe-
cific Constitutional prohibition.47
88 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1889).
39 Id. at 267.
40 See Henkin, "International Concern" and the Treaty Power of the United
States, 63 Aw. J. INT'L L. 272 (1969); Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and Inter-
national Human Rights, 116 PA. L. REV. 1012 (1968).
41 78 U.N.T.S. 1021 (1951).
42 320 U.N.T.S. 4648 (1959).
43 193 U.N.T.S. 2613 (1954).
44 G.A. Res. 2106 (1965) contained in Human Rights: A Compilation of Inter-
national Instruments of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/4 (1967).
45 429 U.N.T.S. 6193 (1962).
46 CLARK REPORT.
47 Id.
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WHY THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED INTERNATIONALLY
From its very beginning, the United States has been the great
believer in, and advocate of, the rights of the individual. This is ex-
pressed in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and
the Bill of Rights. Thus, it is natural for the United States to be a
leader in the world community in promoting rights so well recog-
nized in this country. Practical reasons for such advocacy are also
involved.
Although such conventions (human rights) generally specify standards
already observed in the United States, it has an interest in seeing that
they are observed by as many states as possible, not merely to protect
its own standards, but to promote conditions abroad that will foster
economic development and democratic institutions that are conducive
to prosperity in the United States, and achievement of its foreign policy
objectives. It cannot effectively urge other states to adhere to such con-
ventions without doing so itself.
48
During the debates before the General Assembly which, in
1948, preceded the adoption of the Genocide Convention, Secretary
of State George C. Marshall said:
Governments which systematically disregard the rights of their own
people are not likely to respect the rights of other nations and other
people, and are likely to seek their objectives by coercion and force
in the international field.49
President Kennedy summarized the United States position in
his address at American University on June 10, 1963: "And is not
peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights. 5 °
POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
Particular objections on constitutional grounds to specific
provisions of some treaties have been raised from time fo time.
Occasionally, these go to the phraseology of certain clauses. For
example, with respect to the Genocide Convention, it was asserted
that the use of the phrase "as such" in referring to the destruction
of specifically named groups created an ambiguity. The use of the
phrase "in whole or in part" was asserted to be so broad that the
killing of only a few members of a religious body would constitute
genocide. Two American Bar Association committees considered
these and similar objections and found them without substance.la
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS § 118 at 375 (1965) (Re-
porter's note).
49 Dept. of State Publication No. 3643 (1949).
50 Address by President Kennedy, American University, June 30, 1963.
sa See REPORT OF U.S. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (Exec. Report No. 92-6 1971); Hearings on Exec. 0, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. before
1972]
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As one report concluded, they were "not of a dimension sufficient
singly or together, to warrant non-ratification.))51b
The U.N. International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination has also been questioned. Although
the United States on September 26, 1966, signed the U.N. Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, it has not yet been sent to the Senate for its advice and
consent. Objections have been made to it including the usual argu-
ments raised against other human rights treaties. One of these re-
lates to the provision for referring disputes over the interpretation
or application of the Convention to the International Court of
Justice. A similar provision in the Genocide Convention was charac-
terized as "a stock provision not substantially unlike that found in
many multipartite instruments.1152
One of the frequently repeated objections to most human rights
treaties is that a subject for a treaty, to be a proper one, must be
essentially international and not one that might be dealt with
domestically.53 For example, it is asserted, genocide would not be
a proper matter for international agreement because murder is a
domestic crime. This attempt to exclude subjects which might be of
both international and domestic concern would be contrary to
United States history and practice. It would also deny the ruling
of Missouri v. Holland,54 upholding an international treaty on a
subject which could be dealt with domestically, wherein the Court
said:
No doubt it is true that as between a State and its inhabitants the State
may regulate the killing and sale of such (migratory) birds, but it does
not follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers. 55
a Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. at 147, 196(1971) (Reports of ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities and the
Standing Committee on World Order under Law); Bitker, Genocide Revisited, 56
A.B.A.J. 71 (1970) corrected in 56 A.B.A.J. 296 (1970) ; Goldberg & Gardner, Time
To Act on Genocide Convention, 58 A.B.A.J. 141 (1972).
51b Hearings on Exec. 0, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. before a Subcom. of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. at 178 (1971).
52 11 WHirrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 857 (1968). See Hearings on
Execs. J, K, and L, before a Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 50-51 (1967) (letter of M.G. Torbert, Jr., Deputy Asst Sec.
of State). For other specific objections see Bitker, International Treaty against Racial
Discrimination, 53 MARQUETTE L. REv. 68 (1970); Reisman, Responses to Crimes of
Discrimination and Genocide: An Appraisal of the Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, 1 DENVER J. INT'L L. 29 (1971). For background analysis, see
Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 15 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 996 (1966).
58 Hearings on Execs. J, K, and L, before a Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 21, 31, 33, 37 (Part 2) (1967).
54 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
55 Id. at 434.
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Other domestic and international conflicts are found in the
area of descent and distribution of real estate. In Zschernig v.
Miller,56 concerning probate law, the Supreme Court declared:
"Where these laws conflict with a treaty, they must bow to the
superior federal policy. 1 7 Personal property, protection of credi-
tors' rights, prevention of discrimination on grounds of citizenship
in business opportunities, and the right to purchase and hold land
are also treaty subjects both of international and of domestic con-
cern.
58
The latest in the series of treaties covering subjects of domestic
concern but also of international interest is the Supplementary
Convention of the Abolition of Slavery, etc., ratified by the U.S.
in 1967.59 Inter alia, this treaty obligates the U.S. to take measures
to abolish debt bondage, serfdom, involuntary marriage or transfer
of women for money, and the transfer of widows as inherited prop-
erty. It requires the parties to the treaty to prescribe, where ap-
propriate, suitable minimum ages of marriage and encourages free
consent to marriages. These are matters which have long been
thought of as being essentially of domestic concern, but neither the
United States President nor the Senate had any trouble in approv-
ing the treaty. The American Bar Association also recommended
ratification. °
The rule is also expressed in the Restatement on the Law of
the United States Foreign Relations:
Matters of international concern are not confined to matters exclu-
sively concerned with foreign relations. Usually, matters of interna-
tional concern have both international and domestic effects, and the
existence of the latter does not remove the matter from international
concern.
6l
UNDERSTANDINGS AND RESERVATIONS
There can be little doubt of the constitutional power of the
United States to enter into human rights treaties. It does not, how-
ever, mean that the power "extends so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids."'62 It is conceivable that a particular treaty may
56 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
57 Id. at 441.
58 Hearings on Exec. 0, before a Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Re-
lations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., (1950) (testimony of Solicitor General, Philip B. Perlman).
59 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S No. 6418 (1967).
60 Hearings on Execs. J, K, and L, before a Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 9 (Part 2) (1967).
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS § 117 (1965) (Comment
b). 02 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889).
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include a provision anathema to constitutional requirements. If so,
it is possible to ratify the treaty with a reservation which would ex-
clude or modify the effect of that specific treaty provision.' It is
also possible to ratify with an understanding which one party to a
treaty attaches to a particular provision without changing its legal
significance.'
A reservation which changes any provision of a treaty may
require formal acceptance by other parties to the agreement. Some
treaties contain detailed provisions as to reservations. 5 In contrast,
an tnderstanding is simply a unilateral statement by one party as
to what it believes the treaty to mean. For example, with respect
to the Racial Discrimination Convention,"6 a question was raised as
to whether Article 4 of that treaty was in contravention to the free
speech protection of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, when the
U.S. Representative to the U.N. signed the Race Convention on
September 28, 1966, he stated the understanding of the United
States to be that:
The Constitution of the United States contains provisions for the pro-
tection of individual rights, such as the right of free speech, and nothing
in the Convention shall be deemed to require or to authorize legislation
or other action by the United States of America incompatible with the
provision of the Constitution of the United States of America. 67
In the ratification process by the President and the Senate, such
an understanding can be included if necessary.
EXISTING UNITED STATES OBLIGATIONS
Again and again the U.N. Charter speaks of human rights.
Article 1 of Chapter I asserts that the United Nations is created to
promote "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.""8 The
General Assembly, under Article 13, is required to assist in the
"realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all"0 9
and by Articles 55 and 56, each member nation is required to pro-
63 See note 52, supra.
64 Hearings on Exec. 0, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. before a Subcom. of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. at 163 (1970) (letter of then Ass't
Att'y General, now Justice, Wm. M. Rehnquist); Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 875, 881 (1969) (art. 19). See also SENATE FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS COMMITTEE, BACKGROUND INFORMATION 28 (2d rev. ed. 1971).
65 See U.N. Convention on the Eliminations of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
G.A. Res. 2106A (1965) contained in Human Rights: A Compilation of International
Instruments of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/4 (1967) (art. 20).
60 Id.
67 U.S. Mission to the U.N., Press Release No. 4920, Sept. 26, 1966.
68 U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
69 Id. art. 13.
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mote "universal respect for, and observance" of these rights and
freedoms.70 The Economic and Social Council is empowered, under
Article 62, to recommend ways and means for the observance of
human rights.71 Under Article 68, the Council is further directed to
set up appropriate commissions "for the promotion of human
rights. ' 72 It would be difficult for any member to assert that it is
unaware of its obligations as to human rights under the Charter.
Philip C. Jessup, formerly a member of the International
Court of Justice, succinctly stated the existing law:
It is already law for members of the United Nations, that respect for
human dignity and fundamental human rights is obligatory. The duty is
imposed by the Charter, a treaty to which they are parties.
73
In 1945, the United States Senate, by an overwhelming vote,
89 to 2, gave its advice and consent to ratification of the United
Nations' Charter. This clearly indicated the positive recognition
which the United States accorded to human rights. It is now late in
the game to doubt this country's legal obligations under the Charter.
In a concurring opinion in Oyama v. California,74 Justice Black
recognized the U.S. obligations under the U.N. Charter as follows:
There are additional reasons now why that law stands as an obstacle to
the free accomplishment of our policy in the international field. One
of these reasons is we have recently pledged ourselves to cooperate with
the United Nations 'to promote . . .universal respect for, and observ-
ance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinc-
tion as to race, sex, language or religion.' How can this nation be faithful
to this international pledge if State laws which bar land ownership and
occupancy by aliens on account of race are permitted to be enforced?
75
Obligations of the United States and all members of the United
Nations respecting Charter provisions on human rights, are also
recognized in the recent Advisory Opinion of the International
Court of Justice in the Namibia (South West Africa) case, ren-
dered June 21, 1971. The Court said:
Under the Charter of the United Nations, the former Mandatory had
pledged itself to observe and respect, in a Territory having an interna-
tional status, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race. To establish instead, and to enforce, distinctions,
exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of
race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a
70 Id. arts. 55-56.
71 Id. art. 62.
72 Id. art. 68. See also Survey of International Law by Secretary General, U.N.
Doc. No. A/CN 4/245, at 195-204 (April 23, 1971).
73 P. JEssuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 91 (1952).
74 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1947).
75 Id. at 649-50.
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denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the pur-
poses and the principles of the Charter.76
Although the Advisory Opinion dealt with "a territory having
an international status," it is clear that the pledge (meaning Charter
Articles 55 and 56) referred to by the Court covers human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all. As Professor Egon Schwelb con-
cludes in analyzing the Advisory Opinion:
What is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the
Charter when committed in Namibia, is also such a violation when
committed in South Africa proper or, for that matter, in any other
sovereign Member State or in a Non-Self-Governing or Trust Terri-
tory.77
One of the universally recognized scholars in this field, H.
Lauterpacht, put it this way:
The Charter of the United Nations is a legal document; its language
is the language of law, or international law. In affirming repeatedly the
fundamental human rights of the individual it must of necessity be
deemed to refer to legal rights-to legal rights recognized by interna-
tional law and independent of the law of the state. Moreover, irrespec-
tive of the question of enforcement, there ought to be no doubt that the
provisions of the Charter in the matter of human rights impose upon
the members of the United Nations the legal duty to respect them. In
particular, it is clear that a Member of the United Nations who is
guilty of a violation of these rights commits a breach of the Charter.78
THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
United States policy toward international human rights has
not been wholly consistent. From the time of the drafting of the
U.N. Charter and throughout the preparation of various pertinent
treaties adopted by the U.N., the United States has taken a leading
part in the drafting of instruments protecting human rights. Al-
though Americans sometimes take more credit than seems war-
ranted, it is fair to say that the United States was frequently the
moving spirit in the favorable action on these documents. The
opening session of the U.N. International Conference on Human
Rights in Tehran in 1968, was dominated by the memory of Mrs.
Eleanor Roosevelt in advancing international recognition of human
rights. 79
Unhappily, however, the United States has been one of the
76 [1971] I.C.J. at para. 131.
77 Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and Human Rights Clauses, 66
AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 349 (1972).
78 H. LAUTERPACUT INTERNATiONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIrTs 34 (1950).
79 Bitker, International Conference on Human Rights, Dept. of State Bull. 255
(Sept. 3, 1968).
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laggards in ratifying the very treaties which it supported in the
U.N. 0 At this writing, except for the favorable Report of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Genocide Conven-
tion,sb no changes have occurred since Justice Earl Warren's
statement of December 4, 1968:
How far have we come in developing this international law of human
rights? Over 20 major human rights conventions have been adopted by
the United Nations, the International Labor Organization, and UNESCO.
A few of them are in force among the parties which have acceded to
them. Unfortunately, the United States is a party to only two of them,
and this status has been reached only in the last year. We are still not
a party to such major conventions as the Convention on the Abolition
of Forced Labor, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women,
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination. Nor have we as yet even signed, no less ratified, the
two conventions on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, which grew directly out of the Universal Declara-
tion.81
Undoubtedly, the attitude of the organized bar has had its
effect on the failure of the United States Senate to act. Many state
and local bar associations as well as individual lawyers have taken
public positions supporting those human rights treaties on which
the U.S. Senate has held hearings.8 2 The attitude of the American
Bar Association, however, has generally been negative. In 1949,
the ABA opposed the Genocide Convention 3 and in 1970, by a close
vote of 130 to 126, declined to reverse its original opposition.84
The Association at its annual meeting in August, 1967, declared
that "it supports fully, promotion by the United States, through
the United Nations, of 'universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms,' for all people within all
countries." At the same time, however, it declined to take action with
regard to the Convention on Abolition of Forced Labor and it op-
posed accession to the treaty on the Political Rights of Women.
Nevertheless, in the same resolution, it favored ratification of the
80a See Bitker, Some Remarks on U.S. Policy on the Ratification of the Inter-
national Human Rights Conventions, 11 Hum"A- RIGHTS JoURNAL 653 (1969).
80b REPORT OF U.S. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON GENOCIDE, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (Exec. Report No. 92-6 on Exec. 0).
81 E. Warren, Conference on Continuing Action for Human Rights, Dept. of
State Publication No. 8463 (1968).
82 See Hearings on Exec. 0, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. before a Subcom. of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970); Hearings on Execs. J, K,
and L, before a Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967) ; Hearings on Exec. 0, before a Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., (1950).
83 74 A.B.A. REP. 146 (1949).
84 Hearings on Exec. 0, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. before a Subcom. of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. at 16 (1971).
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Supplementary Slavery Convention.85 The latter covers some mat-
ters usually deemed wholly domestic, such as the right of a woman
to refuse to be given in marriage for a consideration. The Senate ap-
proved ratification of this treaty, but has not yet acted on Forced
Labor or on Women's Political Rights. 6
Attorney General Mitchell on January 26, 1970, stated his
support of the constitutionality of the Genocide Convention. 7 Two
subsequent statements of U.S. official organs, indicated the desir-
ability of ratifying such treaties. The Report of the President's
Commission for the Observance of the 25th Anniversary of the UN
commented that:
The United States would be in a far stronger position to play its his-
toric role as champion of individual rights and to take a leading part
in consideration of alleged violations of international standards if it
ratified the instruments it has helped to develop. 88
In a similar vein, the House of Representatives Sub-Committee
on Foreign Affairs, in its report on the 25th anniversary of the U.N.,
stated that:
We would like to see the United Nations use the occasion of its 25th
anniversary to begin a new chapter in the history of the civilized com-
munity's concern with the protection of basic human rights. To this
end we recommend . . . that the United States at long last move to
adhere to the major pending human rights conventions.89
CONCLUSION
It is long past the time for the United States to carry forward
its own pronounced principles in support of human rights. There
are no valid, basic constitutional objections to ratification of human
rights treaties. If there are specific provisions of particular treaties
which need explanation through understandings, or require reserva-
tions, then understandings or reservations can be made a condition
of ratification.
The need is for the United States to be true to its own ideals
and to join with other nations in recognizing and protecting indi-
vidual rights. In the national interest as well as in the interest of men
everywhere, the United States should act promptly in ratifying
85 See note 60, supra.
86 S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Legislative Calendar 7 (April 11, 1968).
87 Hearings on Exec. 0, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. before a Subcom. of the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. at 165 (1970).
88 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF ConMIsSIoN 23 (1971) (U.S. Gov't Printing Office,
Doc. No. 4000-0261).
89 HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON
THE 25TH U.N. ANNIVERSARY 8 (1970).
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those human rights treaties which it has supported in the United
Nations and its affiliated agencies. The problem of how much the
United States can in fact do to protect human rights through inter-
national agreements requires at least that we become a party to
them. We thereby not only add impetus to what other countries do,
but we are in a stronger position to exert our influence in promoting
goals of the human rights conventions in the world community.
